Conflict in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo has significantly intensified in recent months, sparking fears that it could spiral into a broader regional war. This has become particularly critical following the capture of Goma – a city situated on the eastern border with Rwanda and a regional hub in North Kivu province – by a coalition of rebels led by the March 23 Movement (M23). The violence has triggered a dire humanitarian crisis, with civilians fleeing both the advancing rebels and the devastating effects of ongoing fighting. Multiple African nations, particularly Rwanda, have become involved both diplomatically and militarily.
This quickly developing situation raises several key questions: What are the strategic objectives of the rebels? Will other African states become more deeply involved? And, perhaps most crucially, could this conflict escalate into a new chapter for DRC, echoing the turmoil of the 1990s and early 2000s?
Yet Another War
Conflict, both major and minor, has plagued eastern DRC for over 30 years, with many arguing it stretches back even further. To understand the current political climate, a brief historical context is essential.
After the 1994 Rwandan genocide, in which over 500,000 ethnic Tutsis were killed by the Hutu majority, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), an ethnically Tutsi rebel group originating among Tutsi refugees in Uganda, seized control of Kigali and ousted the Hutu-led government. This triggered a mass exodus of Hutus fearing retribution, with nearly one million fleeing into eastern DRC (then Zaire) and establishing refugee camps, the largest of which being in Goma. The newly installed Tutsi-led government in Kigali saw these camps as a major security threat due to the presence of genocidaires (Hutu’s implicated in the genocide) and former members of the Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR). These concerns proved valid as these groups began launching cross-border attacks, aiming to retake Rwanda. Mobutu Sese Seko, the long-standing leader of Zaire, largely supported the FAR and genocidaires, which the RPF strongly opposed.
In response, the RPF established the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (AFDL), a rebel group primarily made up of Congolese Tutsis (Banyamulenge), to contain the camps and arguably challenge Mobutu’s authority. In 1996, the AFDL, with Rwandan, Ugandan and later Angolan support, launched an uprising that rapidly gained control of much of eastern DRC. The Hutu refugee camps were dismantled, and many residents were repatriated, though some fled into the jungle. The AFDL eventually managed to fight their way across the country and capture the capital, Kinshasa in 1997, overthrowing Mobutu in what became known as the First Congo War. Laurent Kabila, leader of the AFDL, took power and initially hosted both Rwandan and Ugandan forces, with many Rwandans holding senior positions in the newly reformed Congolese Army.
However, Kabila soon grew disillusioned with Rwandan influence and expelled all Rwandan and Ugandan troops by 1998. In response, Rwanda formed a new rebel group, the Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD), which primarily operated in the east. This conflict quickly escalated into the Second Congo War, involving nine African nations—most notably Angola, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, and Zimbabwe—and approximately 25 armed groups. This
destructive and intensely violent conflict, often referred to as Africa’s World War, only subsided in the early 2000s through diplomatic efforts led by South Africa. Despite the war’s end, numerous rebel groups, including Islamist militants, continued to operate in the east, fuelled by the region’s socio-economic devastation.
One of these groups, M23, was founded in 2012 with substantial Rwandan support. It rapidly gained ground, capturing key mining towns in North Kivu and even seizing Goma in 2013. However, the group was ultimately defeated by the Congolese army (FARDC) and UN peacekeepers (MONUSCO), forcing them to retreat. In 2022, M23 resurfaced, regaining territory and eventually capturing Goma again in January 2025.
Goma and Beyond
The capture of Goma marked a pivotal moment in the M23 offensive, signaling a dramatic escalation in the fighting, a deepening humanitarian crisis, and growing international attention. After seizing several key towns in the surrounding area, including Minova and Sake, the rebel forces launched a final assault on the city. Reports suggest that Rwanda had deployed troops across the border at Gisenyi, supporting rebel movements with heavy artillery, however, the Rwandan government strongly denies these allegations. Casualty figures vary, but estimates place the death toll at approximately 3,000, including several foreign peacekeepers, such as 13 South African soldiers.
The current positions of the rebels remain unclear due to a lack of reliable information, compounded by widespread misinformation on both social and traditional media. At the time of writing, the rebels appear to be advancing toward Bukavu, a major regional hub in South Kivu. This southward push was momentarily halted by a joint military operation from the FARDC and the Burundian army. On 4 February, M23 declared a unilateral ceasefire, citing the need to address the humanitarian crisis and denying claims of an impending march on Bukavu. However, this ceasefire was short-lived, as rebel forces quickly seized control of Nyabibwe, located 70 km north of Bukavu. The Congolese government dismissed the ceasefire as a tactical ploy, with President Félix Tshisekedi ordering a large-scale military counteroffensive to reclaim lost territory. Meanwhile, M23 vowed to continue fighting until they had captured Kinshasa and ousted Tshisekedi.
Diplomatic efforts to resolve the conflict have also intensified, with the East African Community (EAC) and Southern African Development Community (SADC) leading multiple summits aimed at bringing Congolese and Rwandan leaders to the negotiating table. However, these efforts have so far yielded little progress. The international response has been largely limited, though European nations and the US have condemned M23’s actions and called on Rwanda to cease supporting the group. The US has also threatened sanctions against military and political leaders in both the DRC and Rwanda unless the conflict is resolved.
In the areas they control, M23 rebels have sought to consolidate their power, likely to demonstrate their ability to govern. In Goma, they have made efforts to reestablish regular operations and return to a semblance of normalcy.
The Third Congo War
There are notable parallels between the current conflict and previous wars in the region. Both the First and Second Congo Wars originated in North Kivu, involved the capture of Goma, and advanced toward Bukavu. These conflicts were also fuelled by Rwanda’s dissatisfaction with the DRC’s government and involved rebels groups proliferating a message of discontent with the government over their failure to meet the needs of the population. The growing involvement of foreign forces and the rebels’ warnings that they will continue fighting until they capture Kinshasa mirror troubling trends seen in past wars.
However, despite this rhetoric, it is unlikely the rebels will threaten Kinshasa in the same timeframe as seen in earlier conflicts. More realistically, their objectives will likely focus on consolidating power in the eastern regions. A Rwandan invasion remains unlikely, unless the DRC adopts a more provocative stance, such as threatening Rwandan territory. Consequently, the rebel advance and their objectives are expected to remain limited in the short term. Historically, conflicts in the region have largely been fought through proxy groups supported by neighbouring states. Even during the Second Congo War, which saw direct engagement between Rwandan and Ugandan forces and Angolan, Namibian, and Zimbabwean troops, the war remained confined to DRC territory. While Burundian, Rwandan, and South African forces are directly involved in the current conflict, it is still highly unlikely that their presence will lead to direct confrontation between these nations, escalating into a regional interstate war.
The trajectory of M23 will depend largely on the Congolese government’s response and Rwanda’s actions in the face of mounting international pressure. Should M23 capture Bukavu, it is likely they will continue targeting other regional hubs, consolidating control over more territory in the east and possibly extending their reach to other regions. The importance of mineral wealth in their strategic objectives cannot be overlooked. By seizing key mining towns, the rebels secure crucial funding for their operations, making control of these areas a driving force behind their military goals. This has far-reaching global implications, as capturing these regions affects the supply chains for vital minerals like cobalt, copper, and gold, while also fostering illegal mining practices.
If Rwanda perceives a direct threat to its national security, it may escalate its involvement in the conflict, further strengthening the rebels’ position and opening the door for more ambitious objectives, including capturing Kinshasa. However, diplomatic efforts and increasing economic pressure on Rwanda to curb its support for the rebels will likely prevent this in the short term.
Ultimately, the coming months will determine the future course of the conflict, as the situation remains volatile, uncertain, and highly complex. While the prospect of a third Congo war seems unlikely, it cannot be entirely ruled out, given that the M23 offensive has gained more ground than any other rebel movement since the 2000s. Despite abundant diplomatic efforts, they have so far proven ineffective in halting the escalating violence and deepening humanitarian crisis.