As we move into 2026, I want to take a few pages to reflect on one of the defining trends of today’s geopolitical landscape– a throughline from nearly all of my recent conversations with policymakers, academics, and civil society organizations. Put simply: it is now apparent that the post-War international order, with its grand transnational institutions and focus on neoliberal economic cooperation, is collapsing, with no clear replacement.
The first year of the second Trump Administration proved to be more volatile than anyone could have had imagined, with a seemingly never-ending torrent of shocking news. Whether in Ukraine, Iran, Venezuela, or Minneapolis, almost no corner of the world went untouched by Trump’s violent, chaotic approach to governing in 2025. The most obvious consequence of this behavior has been the unraveling of US influence around the globe, as erstwhile allies scramble to find a replacement for eight decades of economic and military dependence. And while China’s long-term influence has clearly eclipsed America’s in some areas like renewable energy and high-tech manufacturing, the country itself is increasingly beset by economic, political, and demographic problems which have slowed its trajectory towards hegemonic status. The result, at least for the next few years, looks to be an international order with no clear leadership, where globalized supply chains and free trade are seen as a weakness, and where each country is only as secure as its sphere of influence or the political bloc it belongs to.
And while it may be true that the “rules-based” international order presided over by the US was often little more than a facade, it is also apparent that the direction of the past year marks both a rhetorical and material departure from the decades which preceded it. In turn, this new, increasingly frenetic era of geopolitics demands updated analytical approaches from those of us trying to understand and anticipate world events. Here, the concept of a G-Zero world, first articulated by US political scientist Ian Bremmer back in 2012, offers a useful framework for understanding the emerging global paradigm of this decade: one characterized not by American hegemony, Chinese dominance, or even multilateral cooperation, but by a conspicuous vacuum of global leadership. While Bremmer’s argument has often been criticized as overly fatalistic or premature, I believe that its explanatory value is now increasingly apparent.
Defining G-Zero
To oversimplify slightly, Bremmer's G-Zero thesis posits a world where no single country or durable alliance of countries can effectively meet the challenges of global leadership. Unlike a post-War era dominated by American power, or a multipolar balance envisioned by optimistic internationalists, G-Zero describes an order derived from a vacuum at the center of global governance. Traditional institutions such as the G7, UN Security Council, and WTO remain paralyzed by competing national interests, unable to forge consensus on critical transnational issues such as climate change, pandemic preparedness, regulating artificial intelligence, or managing migration flows.
Nor is G-Zero simply multipolarity by another name. A multipolar world implies multiple and varied centers of power which nonetheless engage in some degree of dialogue, negotiation, and structured cooperation. Bremmer’s thesis of G-Zero, by contrast, suggests an international order based only on fragmentation without coordination, a world where major powers retreat into their own spheres of influence, while global challenges metastasize in the interstitial spaces of failed states, gridlocked institutions, and unregulated markets.
The Drivers of G-Zero Emergence
Several converging trends have accelerated the transition toward this leaderless paradigm by 2026. It is now a widely accepted reality that the United States, while still possessing by far the world’s formidable military and economic capabilities, has demonstrated an increasingly diminished appetite for the costs and entanglements of global leadership. Domestic polarization, fiscal constraints, and a reorientation toward internal challenges have reduced America's willingness to try and serve as the world's policeman, banker, arbiter of disputes, or any other function required of a global hegemon. Pair that with the country’s rapid regressions in institutionalized democracy and human rights, plus staggering levels of inequality, and a model of economic growth driven primarily by tech giants with shady business practices, and it’s not a stretch to say that the US is on a clear trajectory away from international primacy.
Meanwhile, China's rise has not yet translated into global leadership in the traditional sense. Beijing projects power within its region and along strategic trade corridors, but has shown a strong aversion to shouldering the burdens of maintaining a liberal international order; an order, after all, it did not design and from which it seeks selective benefits while avoiding systemic responsibilities. As such, China's model of governance and development offers an alternative to Western liberalism, but not a universalist vision for global cooperation. It offers bilateral deals and transactional relationships, not the alliance structures, security guarantees, and institutional frameworks that characterized American leadership during its hegemonic era.
More fundamentally, the country’s capacity for global leadership has been constrained by mounting domestic challenges that emerged in the wake of COVID-19. While China remains the world’s low and high-tech manufacturing powerhouse, other elements of the economic model that propelled its miraculous three-decade rise (export-driven growth, massive infrastructure investment, a booming property market, etc) have shown signs of exhaustion. The country's real estate crisis, beginning with the Evergrande collapse in 2021 and metastasizing through the sector since, has exposed deeper structural problems. These include overleveraged local governments, a shadow banking system riddled with bad debts, and demographic headwinds that threaten future growth prospects. China's working-age population has also begun to shrink, a consequence of the one-child policy and rapidly declining birth rates that even aggressive pro-natalist policies have failed to reverse. This demographic transition arrives before China has achieved the per-capita wealth of developed nations, threatening to sink the country in the so-called "middle-income trap" which has ensnared other emerging economies. The implications are profound: slower growth means less revenue to address mounting social obligations, from healthcare for an aging population to environmental remediation from decades of industrialization.
These domestic preoccupations have constrained China's global ambitions. A leadership focused on managing property sector instability, youth unemployment rates exceeding twenty percent, and the complex succession dynamics within the Communist Party has less bandwidth for the patient, costly work of building international institutions and providing global public goods. The Belt and Road Initiative, once heralded as China's signature foreign policy achievement, has itself faced reassessment as debt sustainability concerns among recipient nations and pushback against perceived neocolonial practices have complicated Beijing's infrastructure diplomacy.
Meanwhile, Europe, perpetually absorbed by internal contradictions and institutional sclerosis, struggles to speak with a unified voice on the world stage. While the European Union remains an economic giant, it is often a geopolitical dwarf, unable to translate its collective GDP and values into coherent foreign policy action. From energy dependence to defense capabilities, Europe's structural vulnerabilities severely limit its capacity for global leadership. As Belgian Prime Minister Bart De Wever told lawmakers following the EU’s most recent spat with Trump over Greenland: “The past few weeks have made it painfully clear that the European Union often drifts on waves created by others, that we are too dependent on factors beyond our control and have not built on our strengths enough.” Unless the EU is able to change this trajectory by centralizing politically and developing –at a minimum– continental defense and tech industries to rival those of the US or China, it will not be in any position to offer global leadership.
Meanwhile Turkey, India, Brazil and other middle powers naturally prioritize national or regional interests over global ambitions. These governments are consequential players within their neighborhoods, but lack either the capacity or inclination to unilaterally shape global norms and institutions. Instead, they are quickly becoming what Bremmer refers to as “pivot states”, i.e countries able to retain flexibility and the potential for cooperation between many different systems. As he noted more than a decade ago: “geopolitically this is a time where you either want to be big and stable or you want to be small and nimble, and if you’re in between those two places, you have serious problems.” This prediction closely mirrors the words of Canadian PM Mark Carney in his recent speech at Davos, where he urged middle powers to be both “principled and pragmatic… building coalitions that work– issues by issue, with partners who share enough common ground to act together.” Yet such an approach, while strategically beneficial for a state like Canada, has little potential to create durable intergovernmental structures or supply truly global public goods.
The result is a leadership deficit precisely when international challenges demand increasingly coordinated responses, marking the beginning of an era defined by its volatility and risk. In a G-Zero world, there is little room for either large-scale international cooperation or unfettered growth, as either has the potential to become a strategic vulnerability. Instead, countries are likely to focus more strongly on resilience and sovereignty, attempting to futureproof their critical industries and institutions.
Manifestations in 2026-2030
The emergence of a G-Zero world is already manifesting in several observable patterns as we pass the midpoint of the decade, all of which I think will likely intensify in the next half decade.
Global supply chains continue to fragment along geopolitical lines, with "friend-shoring" and economic nationalism replacing the just-in-time efficiency of the late 90s and early 2000s. The universal ambitions of the World Trade Organization largely have given way to competing trade blocs and bilateral arrangements that prioritize security over cost optimization. This fracturing has spread in recent months, exemplified by policy changes like the EU’s 2026 proposed revisions to its Cybersecurity Act, which gives Brussels the power to declare suppliers of critical equipment in telecoms, renewable energy, border security, and other areas as “high-risk”, thus providing the rationale and legal mechanism to ban them from critical EU industries. This is part of a broader emerging fear of strategic dependency, a logic driven by the unreliability of a G-Zero world. And whether in the form of regulations, tariffs, sanctions or otherwise, measures like this are increasingly common around the world, and will likely be one of the most materially noticeable shifts in the next five years.
In the absence of US leadership, climate negotiations continue to stumble forward with symbolic commitments but inadequate enforcement mechanisms. Without a dominant power willing to cajole, incentivize, or pressure others into meaningful action, national and global emissions reduction targets remain aspirational at best. Each nation pursues its own adaptation strategy, leading to a patchwork of responses that fail to address the systemic nature of environmental challenges. And while global emissions are falling, a major risk of a G-Zero world is that high-emission countries increasingly pursue medium or even short-term energy security, while sidelining long-term climate goals seen as detrimental to the national interest or sovereignty. If this logic holds, then the crisis will almost surely worsen over the next decade, further compounding the unstable international environment.
In the technological domain, the absence of global governance is particularly acute. Rather than the development of universal standards for artificial intelligence, data privacy, or digital commerce, we see competing regulatory regimes emerging in different regions. American companies navigate one set of rules, Chinese firms another, and Europeans yet another, with smaller nations forced to choose sides or attempt extreme balancing acts. Similarly, multinational enterprises are increasingly pulled into the crossfire of geopolitical tensions, from Microsoft and SpaceX in Ukraine, to Tik-Tok’s legal issues in America. The result may be a period of technological advancement which is more zero-sum than preceding decades, as the globalized ambitions of the internet and social media age give way to cutthroat mercantilist competition between various economic blocs. And as technology increasingly expands the domain of human activity to low-earth orbit and eventually space itself, these issues will become even more pronounced, likely pushing the most powerful countries into a new type of arms race.
The proliferation of regional conflicts without international resolution mechanisms is another hallmark of a G-Zero world. From proxy wars to territorial disputes, conflicts will simmer without the great power intervention or mediation that might have contained them in previous eras. The United Nations Security Council, paralyzed by veto-wielding permanent members with divergent interests, proves totally ineffective at preventing humanitarian catastrophes or enforcing international norms. While this is nothing new, the G-Zero world of 2026 and beyond seems likely to be the nail in the coffin for its mandate. While the UN’s specialized agencies have, and continue to do excellent work in everything from disaster relief to satellite coordination, these bodies on their own are not sufficient, either to solve violent conflicts or maintain a cohesive global order, even when properly funded. Thus, as the US continues its steady decline and great power conflict intensifies around the world, we may see a substantial increase in global political violence, both inter and intra-state.
Risks and Opportunities
As I think should be clear by this point, I believe that the G-Zero paradigm presents profound risks. Without leadership, collective action problems will go unsolved. Global public goods, from maritime security to disease surveillance, become more underprovided than they already are. The risk of miscalculation between regional powers increases when there is no broker to manage tensions. Economic instability can cascade more easily across an interconnected yet fragmented world. Perhaps most concerning is the erosion of the rules-based international order itself. When no power has both the interest and capacity to enforce norms, violations become the norm. Trump’s position, which is similar to that of Putin, Xi Jinping, and other powerful autocratic leaders is clear: the strong do as they will while the weak suffer as they must, while the world is to be carved up into fiefdoms by the great powers.
As this unfolds globally, I think it is also likely that we will see shifts towards decentralization in the ways international cooperation takes place. For better or worse, smaller coalitions of willing actors (anything from cities, NGOs, or even corporations) may step into some of the leadership voids on a local scale. Issue-specific alliances are also likely to become more prominent, and might prove more nimble and effective than broader institutions. Regional organizations may also seek to provide governance for their neighborhoods even as global institutions atrophy.
As we navigate 2026 and beyond, the G-Zero world is not a prediction so much as a diagnosis of present trends. Whether this proves to be a transitional phase toward a new form of global order or a lasting state of managed chaos remains uncertain. What seems clear is that the international paradigm that governed much of the post-Cold War era has fractured, and no new architecture has yet risen to replace it.
For policymakers, businesses, and citizens, understanding this dynamic will mean recalibrating expectations, most immediately around US security and economic guarantees. International cooperation, wherever it is possible, will become harder but more necessary. National resilience and regional partnerships will gain importance. And the question of who, if anyone, will lead looms over every global challenge we face. The absence of an answer defines our era.